Archive for category Ekonomi

Taşıt araçları sektöründe dış ticaret açığı büyüyor

 

Murat Yülek, Mart  2017, Derin Ekonomi

Zengin ülkelerin en önemli üretim ve ihracat kalemlerinin başında taşıt araçları sektörü geliyor. Eğer yan sanayi ihracatımız olmasa taşıt araçlarında senede 13 milyar dolara yakın dış ticaret açığımız olacaktı. Bunlar sağlıklı gelişmeler değil.

Taşıt  araçları sektörü dış ticareti (2016; milyar USD)

 

Not. Hesaplamalar TÜİK Geniş Ekonomik Gruplar Sınıflamasına Göre (GEGS) dış ticaret verileri kullanılarak yapılmıştır.

Türkiye’de kara taşıt araçları, özellikle de otomobil üretimi hızla artırıyor. İhracatımız da yükseliyor. Ancak Yan sanayi ihracatımız hariç tutulursa otomotiv sektöründe de önemli bir dış ticaret açığımız var. Yan sanayi üretim ve ihracatımız otomobil üretcilerinden bağımsız şirketler tarafından gerçekleştiriliyor. 2016 yılında yan sanayi ihracatımız hariç tutulduğunda otomotiv sektörü dış açığımız 7 milyar dolara ulaştı. Yan sanayi, otomotiv sektörünün dış ticaretini dengeye getiriyor.

Otomotiv  sektörü dış ticareti (2016; milyar USD)

İhracat (yan sanayi hariç) İthalat (yan sanayi dahil) Dış ticaret açığı İhracat (yan sanayi)*
                                10.9                               17.8 -  7.0                                8.9

 

Türkiye’de otomobil üretimi 1995 yılında 419 bin seviyesindeyken geçen sene 1,49 milyon rakamına yükseldi. Bunun 950 bini binek otomobillerinden oluşuyor. Türkiye’de binek otomobili imalatı tamamen yabancı firmalarla yapılan ortaklıklar tarafından yürütülüyor. Bu firmalar uluslararası tedarik zincirlerinin içinde yer aldıkları için üretilen araçların satış sonrası hizmetlerine konu olan parçaları büyük ölçüde yurt dışından geliyor. Satış sonrası hizmetlerde kullanılan parçalar da hem ithal edilen ürünlerde hem de yurt içinde üretilen ürünlerde ithal ediliyor. Parça yerlileşmesi özellikle ithal araçlarda çok düşük.

Ülkemizde  otomotiv sanayinin toplam doğrudan katma değeri (yan sanayi hariç) 5 milyar dolar civarında kalıyor. Bu kadar rakamın düşüklüğü (GYSH’nın yüzde birinden daha düşük), binek otomobil sektörümüzde yerli şirketlerin, yerli marka, tasarım, üretim ve tedarik zincirlerinin olmamasından ya da az olmasından kaynaklanıyor.

Bu arada, binek otomobili üretimimizin büyük kısmı ihraç ediliyor. Buna karşılık yurt içi pazarda satılan binek otomobillerinin büyük kısmı ithal ediliyor. Geçen sene yurt içinde satılan 757 bin binek otomobilinin 564 bini ithal edildi.

Eğer doğru politikalar izlenmezse taşıt araçları sektöründe verilen açık gittikçe büyüyecek. Zira, yandaki grafikte görüldüğü gibi, Türkiye’nin sektördeki dış açığı son yıllardaki ekonomik yavaşlamaya ragmen düşmüyor. Banka kredileri, amortismanların vergiden düşülmesi gibi faktörler binek otomobil ithalatının yüksek kalmasına sebep oluyor.

 

Toplam otomobil üretiminin yarım milyon civarındaki kısmı da kamyon, otobüs, traktor başta olmak üzere binek dışı araçlardan oluşuyor. Burada yerli markalar var ve katma değer yükseliyor.  Bu araçlar Türkiye’ye ciddi ihracat gelir sağlıyor. Ancak bunların üretiminde de binek araçları kadar olmasa da ithalat var.

Yan sanayi üretiminde Türkiye bir hayli gelişme kaydetti. Öyle ki, yan sanayi ihracatı Türkiye’nin binek otomobili ihracatından daha yüksek. Bu sektörün desteklenmesi ve yerliliğinin artırılması gerekiyor. Ancak, toplam yan sanayi ithalatı ihracatından daha fazla. Sebebi yukarıda anlatıldı.

Sonuç kısaca şu; otomotiv sanayimiz önemli dış ticaret açığı veriyor. Bunda rol oynayan ana unsurlar şunlar:

  1. Binek otomobillerinde ticaret açığı veriyoruz (ihracatımız ithalatımıza göre daha düşük). Zira bu sektörümüzde ithalat bağımlılığı çok yüksek.
  2. Türkiye’de üretilen ve çoğunluğu ihraç edilen otomobiller için önemli ölçüde parça ithalatı yapıyoruz. Otobüs, kamyon, traktör gibi binek dışı araçlarının üretiminde de ithalat var. Ancak yan sanayi ithalatında ana rolü yabancı ortaklıklı otomobil sektörü oynuyor. Öyle ki, toplam otomobil ihracatımızdan daha fazla yan sanayi ithalatımız var. Hatta, yan sanayi ithalatımız büyüklük olarak tüm otomotiv ana sanayi ihracatımıza yakın.

Ne yapılması gerekiyor?

  1. Yerli binek otomobili üretiminde yurt içi tedarik zincirleri güçlendirilmeli, yerli yan sanayi ürünlerinin kullanılmasının teşvik edilmelidir.
  2. Yerli otomobil projesi önemlidir. Başarılması durumunda hem sektördeki toplam katma değer yükselir hem de dış ticaret açığı kesilir.
  3. Otomobil yan sanayinin uluslararası rekabetçi gücünün artırılması için sektör hem finansal hem de teknolojik açıdan desteklenmelidir.

ABD ile Türkiye arasında Serbest Ticaret Alanını Konuşalım

Murat Yülek,  Şubat 2017, Derin Ekonomi

Donald Trump Amerika Birleşik Devletleri başkanı oldu. Önümüzdeki 4 yıl dünyayı neler bekliyor? Şu anda görülen, Trump’ın kafasında iki kutuplu bir dünya var. Bir tarafta Anglosaksonlar ve Rusya diğerinde ise Çin. Diğer ülkeler büyük ölçüde önemsiz/‘irrelevant’. Trump’ın dünyasına hoş geldiniz.

Başkan Trump’ın ilk önemli kararı TPP sürecini durdurması oldu. TPP, Obama yönetiminin en önemli politikalarından birisiydi. Avrupa Birliği ile ABD arasında serbest ticaretin  önünü açması ve Atlantik Okyanusu’nun iki tarafı arasında yatırımların da artmasını ön görüyordu. Eşdeğer güç ve gelişmişlik seviyesindeki iki ekonomik alan arasında serbest ticaret ve daha çok yatırım her iki tarafın da işine yarayacaktı açıkçası.

Trump’ın yemin etmesinden önce Brexit’ten sert çıkış yapacağını açıklayan İngiltere’ye, hızlı bir serbest ticaret anlaşması önererek kucak açtı. Avrupa hakkında sert açıklamalara devam ederken bunu yapması Trump’ın kafasında bir Anglo-sakson birliği olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu tercihin sebebi henüz tam olarak belli değil.

Donald Trump tercihleri olan bir lider. İngiltere dışında Trump’ın diğer pozitif tercihleri arasında Rusya da var. En azından siyasi olarak ABD’nin Rusya ile yakınlaşacağı artık kesin gibi. Buna karşılık Meksika ve Çin konusunda Trump çekinmeden negatif tercihler ortaya koydu.

Türkiye konusunda ise Başkan Trump siyasi ve ekonomik tercihini pozitif kullanacak gibi görünüyor. Bu Türkiye açısından ne manaya gelir? Siyasi açıdan Türkiye’nin en önemli beklentisi Fetullah Gülen’in iadesi ve ABD’nin Suriye’de Türkiye’yi yalnız bırakan ve terör gruplarını desteklemesine son verilmesi. Her ikisi açısından da Başkan Trump ve ekibinden olumlu mesajlar alındı şu ana kadar. Bunların ne ölçüde gerçekleşeceğini zaman gösterecek.

Ekonomik açıdan ise Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkilerin Trump döneminde nasıl bir şekil alabileceği henüz belli değil. Türkiye tarafı ABD’ye bir gündem önermedi. Başı oldukça kalabalık olan ABD tarafından da böyle bir gündem gelmedi. Türkiye’nin bu gündemi çalışması ve hazırlıklı olması gerekiyor. Bizce, olası Türk-Amerikan ekonomik gündeminin en önemli maddesi Türkiye ile ABD arasında bir serbest ticaret anlaşmasıdır. Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ticaret her iki ülke açısından da önemsiz derece düşük. Türkiye-AB dış ticaret hacmi 130 milyar doların üzerindeyken Türkiye-ABD ticaret hacmi18 milyar dolar seviyesinde.

2002 yılından sonra Türkiye’nin ABD’ye olan ihracatı artmadı. ABD’nin Türkiye’ye olan ihracatı ise hemen hemen iki katına çıktı. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Türkiye’ye uçak, otomobil ve makineler gibi yükte hafif pahada daha ağır ürünler satıyor. Ancak o da ABD’nin toplam ihracatı içinde oldukça küçük bir orana sahip. Dolayısıyla, her iki ülke de birbirleriyle ticaret yapmıyor denebilir. Karşılıklı yatırımlar da potansiyele oranla oldukça düşük seviyelerde.

Bu durum tersinden okunursa, ortada oldukça önemli bir potansiyelin olduğu görülüyor. Siyasi ilişkilerin derinleşmesine ekonomik ilişkiler de eşlik ederse önümüzdeki dönemde iki ülke arasındaki ticaret hızla artabilir. Trump’ın Avrupa ve Çin ile ilgili menfi tercihleri Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkileri güçlendirici etki yapar. Özellikle tekstil ve hazır giyim alanında. Trump, Meksika’nın aksine, İngiltere’yle olduğu gibi Türkiye ile ticarete olumlu bakacaktır.

Türkiye Trump’ın karşısına ilk baştan itibaren iddialı ve yüklü bir işbirliği gündemiyle çıkmalı. Obama döneminde Amerikan ticaret bakanı Türkiye’nin kamu malları satın alma pazarında ABD’nin oldukça düşük paya sahip olduğunu söylemişti. Aynı şikayet Avrupa Birliği’nden de gelmişti. Oysa Türkiye’nin hem ABD hem de AB kamu satın alma pazarından aldığı pay sıfır. Altını çizelim: sıfır. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye’nin bu konuda da her iki partnerine de söylececeği şey var.

Sıradışı Yıl 2016

Murat Yülek, Ocak  2017, Derin Ekonomi

2016 yılı ekonomik ve siyasi açıdan sıra dışı bir yıl oldu. Uluslararası siyasi risklerin, deyim yerindeyse tavan yaptığı bir yılı geride bıraktık. Bunlar yetmezmiş gibi bir de darbe teşebbüsü yaşadı Türkiye. Bu gelişmeler 2016 yılında Türk ekonomisi üzerinde önemli menfi etkiler oluşturdu.

Yıla, düşürülen savaş uçağının gölgesinde bir çıkmaza giren Türk-Rus ilişkileriyle başladık. Bozulan ilişkilerin en önemli kurbanı ekonomi oldu. Rusya Türk ihraç ürünlerine çeşitli zorluklar ve yasaklar getirdi. Bu özellikle turizm ve Akdeniz bölgesinde üretilen yaş sebze ve meyvelerin ihracatı açısından güçlükler çıkarttı Türkiye’ye. Türkiye’nin en büyük turizm pazarını oluşturan Rusya’dan gelen  turist sayısının düşmesiyle özellikle Akdeniz’deki turizm işletmelerimiz sıkıntıya girdi. Toplamda, Rusya ile yaşanan problem ihracatın 2016 yılında yavaşlamasına sebep oldu.

Türkiye Rusya Krizi sırasında Rusya’ya karşı ekonomik yaptırım uygulamadı. Rusya, enerjinin  dışında, Türkiye’ye tarım, maden ve metaller gibi ürünlerde yüksek miktarlı ihracat yapıyor. Rusya’nın Türkiye’ye bu ürünlerdeki ihracatı, normal yıllada Türkiye’nin Rusya’ya toplam ihracatının iki katına yaklaşıyor. Rusya’nın Türkiye’ye ihraç ettiği ürünlerin Ukrayna gibi başka ülkelerden de kolaylıkla tedarik edilmesi mümkün. Bu yüzden Türkiye’nin elinde de Rusya’ya karşı ekonomik yaptırım uygulama şansına sahipti. Ancak bu kozunu kullanmadı.

Yılın son çeyreğinde Rusya Türkiye ilişkileri iyileşti. Bu sayede, 2017’den itibaren ihracat ve turizm gelirlerinde artışlar olacak. Ancak, kaybın ne ölçüde telaafi edileceğini şu anda bilemiyoruz.

Türkiye 2016 yılında bir de darbe teşebbüsü yaşadı. Fetö terör örgütünün bu teşebbüsünün ekonomiye maliyeti ağır oldu. Ekonomik ve siyasi güven düştü. Şirketlerin yatırım kararları ertelendi. Özel tüketim düştü. Bunların neticesinde, darbe teşebbüsünün yaşandığı üçüncü çeyrekte Türk ekonomisi yüzde 1,8 oranında daraldı. Dördüncü çeyrekte de yavaşlama devam ediyor. Hükümet tarafından alınan tedbirler teşebbüsün kalıcı etkilerinin ortadan kaldırılmasını hedefliyor.

2016 yılının bir diğer özelliği ise yoğun terör idi. Türkiye, PKK’ya ve DAEŞ’e karşı büyük bir harekat başlattı ve netice aldı. Buna karşılık bu örgütler Türkiye’deki terör eylemlerini artırdılar. Bir taraftan halkı terörize etmeyi, diğer taraftan da ayakta kaldıklarını göstermek amacını güden örgütler az sayıda insanla çok gürültü çıkartacağını umdukları eylemlere giriştiler. Bu eylemlerin de ekonomi üzerindeki etkisi menfi oldu. Ancak hükümet ve güvenlik güçlerinin kararlılığı devam etti. Halkın da terörün bitirilmesine yönelik kararlı tavrı ekonomideki istikrarın bu şartlarda olabileveği kadar güçlü devam etmesine katkıda bulundu.

Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkilerin kötüleşmesi ve Avrupa Parlementosu’nun kararı, Türkiye’nin harici ilişkilerini zorlayan bir başka unsur oldu. Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği’nin teröre karşı tavır almasını istemeye devam ediyor. Ancak Avrupa Birliği’nde bu konuda net bir tavır oluşamıyor. Bu arada, Avrupa Birliği 2016 yılında Brexit oylamasından ve İtalya Başbakanı Renzi’nin istifasından sonra tarihinin en zor dönemlerinden birisini yaşıyor. Avrupa Birliği’nin geleceği hakkında hem Avrupa’da hem de dışarıda kamuoyunda önemli soru işaretleri var. Almanya, Fransa, Hollanda gibi ülkelerde yükselen ırkçılık ve yaklaşan seçimler Avrupa’nın uzun dönemli istikrarı hakkında benzer soru işaretlerin ortaya çıkartıyor. Tüm bunlar, bir Avrupa ülkesi olan ve bunlarla yakın ekonomik ilişkileri olan Türkiye’yi 2016 yılında etkilediği gibi önümüzdeki dönemde de etkilemeye devam edecek.

Amerika’da Donald Trump’ın seçilmesi Kasım ayından itibaren dünya piyasalarıyla birlikte Türkiye’yi de etkiledi. ABD’de kısa dönemde büyümenin artması beklenirken orta uzun dönemde zorluklar artacak. Orta-uzun vadede ABD’nin bir borç sıkıntısı yaşama olasılığı bugün dünküne göre çok daha olası görünüyor.

Yükselen dolar endeksi ve ABD’deki hem piyasa hem Fed faizleri Türkiye’de de borçlanma maliyetlerini artırdı. OPEC kararı sonrası petroldeki artışlar ise Türkiye açısından hem olumsuz hem olumlu etki gösterecek. Petrol zengini Rusya, Azerbaycan ve Ortadoğu ülkelerinin gelirlerinin artması Türkiye’nin ihracatını destekleyecek. Buna karşılık, devam eden enerji bağımlılığı sebebiyle ithalat faturası ve cari açık da yükselecek.

Kısaca; 2016 zor bir yıl oldu. Jeopolitik ve ekonomik riskler yükseldi. Darbe riski de yaşayan Türk ekonomisinin direnci denenmeye devam etti. İyi haber, Türk ekonomisi 2016 yılından da başarıyla çıktı. Kötü haber, 2017 yılı da 2016’dan daha iyi olacak gibi görünmüyor.

Milli Hesaplarda Gözden Geçirme

Murat Yülek, Aralık 2016, Derin Ekonomi

TÜİK geçen hafta üç önemli istatistik seti yayımladı. Bunlardan birincisi yeni milli hesaplar (GSYH) rakamlarıydı. İkincisi iller bazında GSYH rakamları (yani, toplam ülke bazındaki GSYH’nın hangi illerden ne kadarının elde edildiği) rakamları 2004-2014 dönemi için güncellendi. Üçüncüsü, Türk ekonomisinin, girdi çıktı tablosu (yani katma değerin alt sektörler arası akışını gösteren tablo; bu tablo, hangi sektörün hangi sektöre ne miktarda katma değer girdisi sağladığını gösteriyor) 2012 yılına güncellendi.

Her üç setteki güncelleme de çok önemli. İlk gözünüze çarpacak şey güncellemelerin neden bu kadar geç geldiği olabilir. İller bazında GSYH en son 2001 yılı itibariyle açıklanmıştı. Türk ekonomisi Girdi Çıktı Tablosu en son 2002 yılı itibariyle güncelenmişti. İlgili araştırmacılar Groningen Üniversitesi’nin tüm dünya için oluşturduğu girdi çıktı tablolarında kullanılan yaklaşık değerleri kullanıyorlardı.

Bu güncellemelerin daha sık ve daha hassas yapılması için TÜİK’in eleman sayısının artırılması gerekiyor. Avrupa ülkelerinde istatistik ofislerinde çalışan insan sayısı TÜİK’e göre daha fazla. Avrupa’da ayrıca, sektörel bakanlıklar ve kamu kurumlardaki istatistik birimlerinde de çok sayıda insan çalışıyor. Bunlar da milli istatistik kurumunun çalışmalarına destek oluyor. TÜİK’deki eleman eksikliğinin istatistik üretiminde başka menfi etkileri de oluyor; örneğin TÜİK üç aylık GSYH büyüme istatistiklerini Avrupa ülkeleri ve ABD’ne göre daha geç açıklıyor.

Gelelim milli hesaplar revizyonuna. Toplam GSYH ise daha önce 1987 ve 2008 yıllarında gözden geçirilmişti. Yani aradan 8 sene geçmiş. Bu yılki düzenlemeler, uluslararası güncellenen standartlara uyum sağlanması amacıyla yapıldı. 2009 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler milli hesaplar standartlarını (System of National Accounts-SNA) güncellemişti. Avrupa Birliği istatistik birimi olan Eurostat da 2010 yılında kendi sistemi olan Avrupa Hesap Sistemi’ni (European System of Accounts-ESA) SNA’e uyumlu hale getirmişti.

Bu tip genel ya da tek tek ülkelerde milli hesapların gözden geçirilmesi sık sık karşılaşılan olaylar. Örneğin Çin istatistik birminin (NBS), genel ekonomik sayımın ardından 2005 yılında gerçekleştirdiği revizyonda ülkenin GSYH’sı 300 milyar dolar (Türkiye’nin 2003 resmi GSYH’sına yakın) yükselmiş ve yeni rakamla dünyanın dördüncü büyük ekonomisi haline gelmişti. Çin bundan önce 1993 yılında GSYH içindeki hizmet sektörü sayımını gerçekleştirdikten sonra sektör hasılasını yüzde 32 oranında yükseltmişti (toplam GSYH’ya yüzde 10 olarak yansımıştı). Çin 2013 yılında da bir revizyon yapmış ve GSYH rakamlarını 309 milyar dolar yükseltmişti.

Dönemsel olarak GSYH büyüme rakamlarında revizyonlarla da oldukça sık karşılaşılıyor. Özellikle dönemsel büyüme rakamlarını hızlı açıklayan ülkelerde. Zira, iktisatçılar, gözlemciler, iş dünyası ve kamu görevlileri istatistiklerin hızlı yayımlanmasını istiyor. İstatistiklerin yayımlanma hızı arttıkça da revizyon ihtiyacı artıyor.

TÜİK tarafından geçen hafta yayınlanan, ESA 2010 ile uyumlu  yeni GSYH serisi tartışma konusu oldu. Bunun iki ana sebebi var. Birincisi, revizyon oldukça büyük. Kişi başına gelirimiz tekrar 10 bin doların üzerine çıktı. Kritik bir değişken olan cari açığın GSYH’ya oranı düştü. Bununla birlikte, topladığımız vergilerin ve kamu harcamalarının ya da örneğin toplam sağlık harcamalarının GSYH’ya oranı düştü. Yani, mevcut ve geçmişe dönük bir çok makroekonomik açıklamamızı değiştirmemiz gerekiyor şimdi.

İkincisi, büyüme oranları eski serideki oranlardan çok farklılaştı. Örneğin geçen yılki büyüme oranı yeni serilerle yüzde 6,1 oranında büyüdü. Bu da, Türk ekonomisinde, son 10 yıl için anlattığımız büyüme eğilimlerinin değiştirilmesine sebep oldu.

ESA ile uyum çalışmasının bu denli büyük seviye ve yıllık büyüme farkları çıkartması şaşırtıcı. Ancak TÜİK teknik olarak güçlü bir kurum. Daha ayrıntılı açıklamaları önümüzdeki dönemde göreceğimizi düşünüyorum.

Doların ateşini düşürmemiz gerekiyor

Murat Yülek, Kasım 2016, Derin Ekonomi

Türkiye yüklü bir siyasi gündem ve jeopolitik risklerle karşı karşıya. Bir yandan Suriye’de güvenli bir bölge oluşturmak amacıyla sıcak bir savaşın içinde. Bu savaş başarılı gidiyor ve tamamlanınca Türkiye’deki riskler düşecek. Darbe girişimiyle ilgili ve teröre karşı (PKK, DAEŞ, Fetö) sıcak ve soğuk mücadele ülke içinde ve dışında devam ediyor. Bu mücadelelerde Türkiye’nin yurt dışındaki dostlarından aldığı destek son derece sınırlı. Yabancı müttefiklerimiz, özellikle Avrupa ülkeleri, teröre karşı gerekli tavrı göstermiyorlar. Fiilen terörün yanında yer alanları var.

Moody’s Eylül ayında Türkiye’nin notunu düşürdü. Bu, teknik temellerden yoksun siyasi boyutu yüksek bir karardı. Bu köşede, bu nitelikte bir riske dikkat edilmesi gerektiği yazılmıştı. Derecelendirme kuruluşlarının teknik boyuttan uzaklaşarak siyasi kaynaklı diyebileceğimiz kararlar alması Fitch’in de benzer bir not kararı verme ihtimalini güçlendiriyor.

Dış konjonktür de belirsiz. Dünya, Donald Trump’ın hangi politikaları izleyeceğini nasıl bir performans göstereceğini merakla bekliyor. Fransız seçimlerinde de yine belirsizliğin kazanması olası görünüyor. Brexit sonrası önemli bir yara alan Avrupa Birliği’nde İtalya’daki anayasa referandumu yeni bir belirsizlik oluşturuyor. Eğer Başbakan Renzi’nin reform önerileri referandumda kaybederse bunun ardından Italexit tartışması güçlenecek. Yani Avrupa Birliği’nin varoluşuyla ilgili  riskler artacak.

Uluslararası siyasi gelişmeler, ekonomik konjonktürü de yakından etkiliyor. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde tahvil faizleri hızla yükseldi. 10 yıllıklarda artış 10 günde 40 baz puana ulaştı. Avrupa 5 ve 10 tahvillerinde de benzer hareket yaşandı. Bu, Fed’in faiz kararı vermesinden önce portföylerde değişikliğin başladığını gösteriyor. Kısa dönemde bu portföy değişiklikleri gelişmekte olan ülkelerde kurları menfi etkiliyor.

Amerika’da ekonomik büyüme ve enflasyonun yükselmesi ihtimali dolar endeksini yükseltiyor.Trump’ın seçilmesinin altının yükselmesine sebep olması beklenirdi. Kısa bir süre öyle de oldu. Ancak doların hızlı yükselmesi altını baskılıyor. Altın yükselmek yerine düşüyor.

Uzun vadede ise Trump’ın politikalarının ve yönetiminin bütçe açığı ve borcu zaten yüksek olan Amerikan ekonomisine darbe vurma ihtimali var. Vergi indirimleri, ABD ekonomisinin kısa sürede harekete geçirse de uzun dönemde zaten toplam vergi/GSYH açısından dünyanın en düşük ülkeleri arasında  yer alan ABD’de kalıcı büyüme sağlamaz. Trump döneminde borç ve bütçe açığı artacak olan ABD’nin risk görünümü yükselecek. ABD’deki dünya ekonomisini menfi etkileyecek. Bunun üzerine Çin gibi ülkelerle olan ekonomik/ticari sürtüşmeleri de eklemek gerekiyor.

Bu uluslararası ortam Türkiye’yi de etkiliyor. Özellikle kur ve faiz üzerinden. Dolar endeksi Trump’ın seçilmesinin ardından yüzde 3,5 yükselme kaydederken TL’deki yükseliş yüzde 7,3 oldu. Gösterge faizdeki yükseliş 80 baz puana, CDS primlerindeki yükseliş ise 25 baz puana yaklaştı. Türkiye’nin yapması gereken, kendi kontrolünde olan ‘görünüm risklerini’ düşürmek. Kendi kontrolünde olan siyasi ve ekonomik riskleri (belirsizlikleri) düşürmekle Türkiye ‘toplam risk görünümünü’ düşürmüş olacak.

Son 10 senede ulaşılan makroekonomik istikrar ve ekonomimizin direnci kendisini darbe girişimi sonrasında göstermişti. Türk ekonomisinin dış şoklara karşı direnç gücü devam ediyor. Bunu  göstermenin tam zamanı. En başta doların ateşinin düşürülmesi gerekiyor. Dolar kuru, yatırımcıdan iş adamına, öğrenciden işçiye herkesin her an takip ettiği bir gösterge durumunda. Kısa sürede hızlı yükselmesi ekonomimizin direnci ve istikrarıyla ilgili sorular oluşturuyor. Doların yükselmesi Merkez Bankası’nın tek başına sorumlu olduğu bir alan değil. Doların son dönemdeki yükselişi Merkez Bankası’nın politikalarından kaynaklanmadığına göre düşürülmesi de tek başına Merkez Bankası tarafından sağlanamaz. Önümüzdeki dönemde hükümet tarafından alınan kararlar, yapılan açıklamalar ve konulan hedefler, resmi yorumlar (doların yükselmesiye ilgili olanlar dahil) bu yüzden büyük öneme sahip. Hükümetin, önümüzdeki dönemde hem dışarıdan kaynaklanan risklerin bertaraf edilmesine hem de ilave risk algısının ortaya çıkartılmamasına dikkat etmesi gerekecek.

Türkiye ve Asya Ekonomik Birliği

Murat Yülek, Kasım 2016, Derin Ekonomi

Ülkeler arasındaki siyasi sınırların ortaya çıkarttığı ‘bölünme’ ekonomik açıdan çok maliyetlidir.  Örneğin, Türkiye’nin doğu ve güneydoğusunda sınırın öteki tarafındaki komşularımızla ilişkilerimizin kötü olduğu dönemlerde ekonomik hinterland sınırlanan Hakkari ya da Gaziantep gibi illerimizin ekonomileri bir ‘ada’ ekonomisi idi. Gaziantep gibi, Türkiye ve dünya ile bütünleşebilen illerimiz kendilerine bir ekonomik çıkış fırsarı oluşturabildiler. Ancak Hakkari gibileri bunu başaramadılar.

Benzer sıkıntılar Afrika’dan Asya’ya çok sayıda ülkede yaşanageldi. Örneğin, sömürge geçmişleri sebebiyle resmi dilin İngilizce olduğu Gambiya ile resmi dili Fransızca olan Senegal’in aralarındaki ticaret ve ekonomik kalkınma ilişkileri sınırlar sebebiyle zayıf kaldı. Avrupa, benzer problemleri, Avrupa Birliği’nin kurulması ve 1992 yılında oluşturulan tek pazar sayesinde aşmaya çalıştı. Bugünlerde çatırdasa da tek pazar Avrupa ülkelerinin ve özellikle Almanya’nın çok işine yaradı.

ABD, tek bir maliye otoritesi, tek bir para birimi ve merkez bankası, tek bir dış politika kısaca tek bir sistemi yayarak bu hale gelmişti. Avrupa Birliği, 50’den fazli ülkeyi tek bir ülke haline getirebilen ve böylece dünyanın en büyük ekonomik, askeri ve siyasi gücü haline gelen ABD’ne öykünmenin bir sonucuydu. AB, ABD’nin birliğini tamamıyla kopyalayamadı; şimdilerde bir merkez bankası ve ortak maliye kuralları olsa da özellikle siyasi ve askeri açıdan bir birliğe sahip değil. Bununla birlikte, tek pazar, avro ve bunun ortaya çıkarttığı artan ticaret Avrupa’da üretim ölçeklerini büyüttü. Her şeye ragmen AB şu ana kadarki en başarılı ve tek önemli ekonomik bütünleşme örneği olarak önümüzde duruyor.

Asya’ya bakıldığında ekonomik işbirliği ve bütünleşme hemen hemen yok denecek kadar az. Oysa, küçük, düşük gelirli, az gelişmiş, denize kıyısı olmayan çok sayıda ülkeye sahip olan Asya dengeli bir ekonomik işbirliği şemsiyesine ihtiyaç duyuyor. Asya’daki büyük güçler, Çin ve Rusya, kendi Asya işbirliği önerilerini ortaya attılar. Kazakistan lideri Nursultan Nazarbayev tarafından 1994 yılında ortaya atılan  Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği fikri bugün Rusya liderliğinde 6 ülkeden oluşuyor. İçlerinde Kazakistan ve Rusya olduğu için 20 milyon kilometrekareklik alanı kapsıyor. Üyeleri arasında gümrük birliği oluşturuldu.

Çin Komünist Partisi Lideri Xi Jinping tarafından ortaya atılan “Bir Yol Bir Kuşak” (One Road One Belt) Orta Doğu’nun bir bölümünü ve Asya’yı kapsayan bir işbirliği projesi. Bu projenin temelinde ulaştırma ve haberleşme ağlarının güçlendirilmesi ve kültürel alan da dahil ekonomi dışı işbirliğinin de güçlendirilmesi yatıyor. Çin tarafından kurulan Asya Altyapı Yatırım Bankası’nın Çin kontrolündeki yeni bir dünya bankası gibi çalışması öngürülüyor. ABD’nin bu bankanın kurulmasına karşı çıktığı ve bu konuda Avrupa ülkelerini etkilemek için de girişimlerde bulunduğu biliniyor. ABD’nin endişesi, muhtemelen Çin’in bu banka eliyle Asya’da kendi şirketlerince altyapı işleri yapacak olması ve siyasi olarak güçlenmesi.

Bir Yol Bir Kuşak projesi şu anda resmi olarak Şanghay İşbirliği Teşkilatı’nın (SCO) gündeminde. Hem Çin hem de Rusya’nın üyesi olduğu teşkilat Avrasya’da ekonomik, siyasi, kültürel ve askeri işbirliğini amaçlıyor. Gündemindeki ana konularından birisi terörizmin önlenmesi. Terörizm deyince tabi ‘İslami terörizm’ tabir edilen şey kastediliyor.

Türkiye bu forumların hiç birisine üye değil. SCO ise gözlemci ülke olarak yer alıyor. Türkiye’nin dünya ekonomisinin büyüme motoru ve ağorlık Merkezi haline gelen bu bölgede daha aktif hale gelmesi gerekiyor. Bir Avrasya ekonomik kuşağı önerisini ilk getirmesi gereken ülkelerden birisi Türkiye; bu bir “düşünce önderliği” görevi Türkiye açısından. Bu öneri, başarılı bir icraat planlanarak  geliştirilinceye kadar ise Türkiye’nin mevcut platformlara girmesi ve aktif olması gerekiyor. Bundan önce de ECO gibi aktif ve önemli üyesi olduğu platformlarda öncerlik yapması gerekiyor. ECO gibi platformlarda uzun süredir üzerinde uğraşılan ancak çok az mesafe alınmış olan tercihli ticaret hedefinden serbest ticarete geçmenin zamanı geldi geçti bile.

When will Christian Amanpour call a duck a duck?

International media failed miserably in the Egyptian case. They failed miserably because the way they reflected the events showed they almost openly support a bloody coup. Sorry I should not have said a coup. I should not have listened to Mr. Mc Cain; a duck is (only sometimes) called a duck when it is politically right.

Amanpour is apparently in a long vacation when hundreds of civilian demonstrators are being killed by Egyptian military. She was unwilling even to air the Turkish officials trying to explain their position during June’s violant demonstrations in Turkey. Now she is silent for weeks when insistently peaceful demonstrators in Adawiyyah circle are being shot by military snipers.

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G20’nin Sonucu Güçlü IMF

Dünya Gazetesi
28 Eylül 2009, Küresel Bakış

Geçen haftaki G20 toplantısı, güzel kaleme alınmış ve bir çoğumuzun altına imza atabileceği bir bildirgeyle sona erdi. Sorun, bildirgenin daha çok bir “wish-list” görünümünde olması, çok çeşitli konulara el atması, içinde önemli tutarsızlıkların olması ve en önemlisi imzalanan kararların başarıyla uygulanıp uygulanamayacağında. Bir başka deyişle niyet iyi ama sonuç belirsiz.
Dikkati çeken magazinsel bir nokta; anlaşıldığı kadarıyla yaklaşan seçimlerde işlerine yarasın diye Gordon Brown ve Angela Merkel’in önerileri bildirgeye isimleriyle verilmiş. Mr. Sarkozy’nin performansı Pittsburgh’da nedense düşmüş; metinde ismi geçmemiş! Neyse ki sonuç duyurulurken Mr. Obama’nın yanında Gordon Brown ile birlikte yer almayı başarmış.
Ucuz krediye son mu? Devam mı?
Önce tutarsızlıklardan başlayalım. G20 liderleri yayınladıkları bildirgede en kısa anlatımıyla dünya ekonomisinin ucuz/kolay kredi genişlemesiyle desteklenen “boom-bust” /“şiş balon-patla balon” tipi büyüme paterninden sürdürülebilir bir büyüme paternine geçmesi gerektiğini söylüyorlar. Peki şu anda hem ABD, hem Japonya hem de Avrupa’da krizden çıkışın ana politika aracı ucuz para yani ucuz kredi değil mi?
Politika Koordinasyonu
Gelelim sonuçlara. Liderlerin anlaştıkları en önemli nokta, politika koordinasyonu. Kasım 2009’a kadar Maliye Bakanlıkları ve Merkez Bankaları bir “Çerçeve Politika” oluşturmaları öngörülüyor. Böylece G20 ülkelerinin krizden çıkış süreci ve sonrasında politika koordinasyonunu güçlendirmeleri kararlaştırılıyor.
Bu konu şansa bırakılmamış. Alınan kararlara göre IMF hem ülkelere ekonomi politkaları danışmanlığı fonksiyonunu güçlendirecek (muhtemelen güçlendirilmiş Article IV süreciyle) hem de ülkelerin politikalarının birbirleriyle tutarlı ve uyumlu hale getirilmesini sağlayacak. Bu da, ikinci önemli sonuç. Pittsburgh Zirvesi IMF’yi müthiş bir şekilde öne çıkartıyor. Hatırlayın daha iki sene öncesine kadar IMF’nin artık bir fonksiyonu kalıp kalmadığı konuşuluyor ve kuruluş eleman çıkartıyordu. Dünyada şu anda ulusal politikaların birbirleriyle tutarlı hale getirilmesini sağlayabilecek tek uluslararası kurum var – IMF. Sonuç bildirgesinde IMF’ye çok önemli görevler veriliyor: G20 ülkeleri için ileri dönük makroekonomik değerlendirmeler çerçevesinde bu ülkelerin milli maliye ve para politikalarının birbirleriyle tutarlılıklarının incelenmesi ve bunun G20 ve IMFC’ye rapor edilmesi.
Politika koordinasyonu çok önemli bir konu. Liderlerin yayınladığı sonuç bildirgesine göre “G20’ler güncelleştirilmiş politika hedefleri konusunda anlaşacaklar; orta vadeli politika çerçevelerini ve sonuçlarını bütüncül olası sonuçlarıyla değerlendirecekler; ortaya çıkabilecek finansal riskleri göz önünde tutacaklar ve bunlara göre milli politikalarını gözden geçirecekler.” Bunların altına bir çoğumuz imza atarız. Soru: bu göz yaşartıcı seviyede politika koordinasyonu realist bir bakışla ne ölçüde gerçekleştirilebilir? Kısa cevap: tatmin edici seviyede değil. AB’nin kendi içindeki çok daha basit seviyedeki politika koordinasyonunda yaşanan komedileri hatırlayın.
Finans Sektörü Düzenlemeleri
Sonuç bildirgesindeki, bir başka önemli konu finans sektörünün düzenlenmesiyle alakalı. Önceden başlayan çalışmalardan henüz fazla bir sonuç alınamadı. Bu bildirgeden sonra sermaye yeterlilik oranlarının yükselmesi gerçekleşecek gibi. Bankaların kolay borçlanmaları ve dolayısıyla kolay borç vermeleri engellenecek. Kullanılan dil mutedil. Ancak baştada değindiğim gibi şu dünya ekonomisinin üçte ikisini oluşturan ana ekonomilerde krizden çıkış için bunun tam tersi politikalar uygulanıyor.
Banka yöneticilerine verilen primlerin uzun vadeli başarıya endekslenmesi ve sıkı denetlenmesi kararı olumlu. OTC ürünleri borsa kapsamına alınması, yakından izlenmesi, şeffaflığının artırılması da öyle. Batışı dünya üzerinde etki yapabilecek büyük uluslararası finansal kuruluşların uluslararası faaliyetleri daha sıkı denetlenmesi öngörülüyor. Zor ama doğru bir karar. Uluslararası muhasebe stadartlarının güçlendirilmesi, uluslararası muhasebe standartlarını geliştiren IASB’nin güçlendirilmesi, vergi cennetlerinin sistem içine alınmasına devam edilmesi de doğru kararlar. Mesele uygulanmalarında.
Para-Maliye Politikaları
Tutarsızlıkların olduğu başlıklardan birisi. Bildirgede, uzun süredir büyük cari açık veren ülkelerin “özel tasarrufları yükseltmesi” ve “maliye politikasını daraltması” kararlaştırılıyor. Bu en başta ABD’yi, yani son 5 senedir konuştuğumuz “ dengesizliklerin” epi-center’ını ilgilendiriyor. Peki tekrar büyüyebilmek için özel tüketim ve kamu harcamalarına bağımlı olan ABD altına imza attığı bu politikayı uygulayabilir mi?
ABD’nin durumunu bir tarafa bırakırsak. Bildirgenin başka kısımlarında krizin ortaya çıkardığı yavaşlamanın aşılmasında “şu ana kadar uygulanan para ve maliye politikalarının başarılı olduğu” ve bu sürecin sonuna kadar götürülmesi için şu ana kadar kısaca “ne gerekiyorsa yapılacağı” söyleniyor.
Dolayısıyla, kolay para ve maliye politikalarına devam.
Diğer konular
Bildirgede, enerji güvenliği ve çevre, fakir kesimlerin desteklenmesi, yüksek becerili iş sahalarının açılması, korumacılığın sona erdirilmesi, G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, IMF ve Dğnya Bankası yönetişim kalitesinin yükseltilmesi gibi çok çeşitli konulara girilmiş.
Keşke iki günlük toplantı bu kadar iddialı bir gündeme sahip olmasaydı. Bu başlıklardan bazılarının altına, prensip olarak alkışlanacak hedefler konulmuş. Ana sorular: acaba bu kadar önemli başlıkların iki günde yeterince tartışıldığını düşünebilirmiyiz ve bu kadar iddialı bir gündemi G20 nasıl takip edecek?
IMF – Dünya Bankası Yönetişim kalitesi başlığı yeterli ipucunu veriyor: zengin ülkelerden fakir ülkelere yüzde 3-5 arasında kota kaydırılması!
Gelecek hafta IMF toplantılarında olacağım. Konu tartışılır mı dersiniz?

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G20 The Pittsburgh Summit: Leaders’ Statement:

I am posting the final communique of the G20 Summit below for reference.

Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit
September 24 – 25, 2009

PREAMBLE

1. We meet in the midst of a critical transition from crisis to recovery to turn the page on an era of irresponsibility and to adopt a set of policies, regulations and reforms to meet the needs of the 21st century global economy.

2. When we last gathered in April, we confronted the greatest challenge to the world economy in our generation.

3. Global output was contracting at pace not seen since the 1930s. Trade was plummeting. Jobs were disappearing rapidly. Our people worried that the world was on the edge of a depression.

4. At that time, our countries agreed to do everything necessary to ensure recovery, to repair our financial systems and to maintain the global flow of capital.

5. It worked.

6. Our forceful response helped stop the dangerous, sharp decline in global activity and stabilize financial markets. Industrial output is now rising in nearly all our economies. International trade is starting to recover. Our financial institutions are raising needed capital, financial markets are showing a willingness to invest and lend, and confidence has improved.

7. Today, we reviewed the progress we have made since the London Summit in April. Our national commitments to restore growth resulted in the largest and most coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus ever undertaken. We acted together to increase dramatically the resources necessary to stop the crisis from spreading around the world. We took steps to fix the broken regulatory system and started to implement sweeping reforms to reduce the risk that financial excesses will again destabilize the global economy.

8. A sense of normalcy should not lead to complacency.

9. The process of recovery and repair remains incomplete. In many countries, unemployment remains unacceptably high. The conditions for a recovery of private demand are not yet fully in place. We cannot rest until the global economy is restored to full health, and hard-working families the world over can find decent jobs.

10. We pledge today to sustain our strong policy response until a durable recovery is secured. We will act to ensure that when growth returns, jobs do too. We will avoid any premature withdrawal of stimulus. At the same time, we will prepare our exit strategies and, when the time is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a cooperative and coordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility.

11. Even as the work of recovery continues, we pledge to adopt the policies needed to lay the foundation for strong, sustained and balanced growth in the 21st century. We recognize that we have to act forcefully to overcome the legacy of the recent, severe global economic crisis and to help people cope with the consequences of this crisis. We want growth without cycles of boom and bust and markets that foster responsibility not recklessness.

12. Today we agreed:

13. To launch a framework that lays out the policies and the way we act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced global growth. We need a durable recovery that creates the good jobs our people need.

14. We need to shift from public to private sources of demand, establish a pattern of growth across countries that is more sustainable and balanced, and reduce development imbalances. We pledge to avoid destabilizing booms and busts in asset and credit prices and adopt macroeconomic policies, consistent with price stability, that promote adequate and balanced global demand. We will also make decisive progress on structural reforms that foster private demand and strengthen long-run growth potential.

15. Our Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth is a compact that commits us to work together to assess how our policies fit together, to evaluate whether they are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced growth, and to act as necessary to meet our common objectives.

16. To make sure our regulatory system for banks and other financial firms reins in the excesses that led to the crisis. Where reckless behavior and a lack of responsibility led to crisis, we will not allow a return to banking as usual.

17. We committed to act together to raise capital standards, to implement strong international compensation standards aimed at ending practices that lead to excessive risk-taking, to improve the over-the-counter derivatives market and to create more powerful tools to hold large global firms to account for the risks they take. Standards for large global financial firms should be commensurate with the cost of their failure. For all these reforms, we have set for ourselves strict and precise timetables.

18. To reform the global architecture to meet the needs of the 21st century. After this crisis, critical players need to be at the table and fully vested in our institutions to allow us to cooperate to lay the foundation for strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

19. We designated the G-20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation. We established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to include major emerging economies and welcome its efforts to coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation.

20. We are committed to a shift in International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota share to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries of at least 5% from over-represented countries to under-represented countries using the current quota formula as the basis to work from. Today we have delivered on our promise to contribute over $500 billion to a renewed and expanded IMF New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).

21. We stressed the importance of adopting a dynamic formula at the World Bank which primarily reflects countries’ evolving economic weight and the World Bank’s development mission, and that generates an increase of at least 3% of voting power for developing and transition countries, to the benefit of under-represented countries. While recognizing that over-represented countries will make a contribution, it will be important to protect the voting power of the smallest poor countries. We called on the World Bank to play a leading role in responding to problems whose nature requires globally coordinated action, such as climate change and food security, and agreed that the World Bank and the regional development banks should have sufficient resources to address these challenges and fulfill their mandates.

22. To take new steps to increase access to food, fuel and finance among the world’s poorest while clamping down on illicit outflows. Steps to reduce the development gap can be a potent driver of global growth.

23. Over four billion people remain undereducated, ill-equipped with capital and technology, and insufficiently integrated into the global economy. We need to work together to make the policy and institutional changes needed to accelerate the convergence of living standards and productivity in developing and emerging economies to the levels of the advanced economies. To start, we call on the World Bank to develop a new trust fund to support the new Food Security Initiative for low-income countries announced last summer. We will increase, on a voluntary basis, funding for programs to bring clean affordable energy to the poorest, such as the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program.

24. To phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest. Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies encourage wasteful consumption, reduce our energy security, impede investment in clean energy sources and undermine efforts to deal with the threat of climate change.

25. We call on our Energy and Finance Ministers to report to us their implementation strategies and timeline for acting to meet this critical commitment at our next meeting.

26. We will promote energy market transparency and market stability as part of our broader effort to avoid excessive volatility.

27. To maintain our openness and move toward greener, more sustainable growth.

28. We will fight protectionism. We are committed to bringing the Doha Round to a successful conclusion in 2010.

29. We will spare no effort to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations.

30. We warmly welcome the report by the Chair of the London Summit commissioned at our last meeting and published today.

31. Finally, we agreed to meet in Canada in June 2010 and in Korea in November 2010. We expect to meet annually thereafter and will meet in France in 2011.

* * *
1. We assessed the progress we have made together in addressing the global crisis and agreed to maintain our steps to support economic activity until recovery is assured. We further committed to additional steps to ensure strong, sustainable, and balanced growth, to build a stronger international financial system, to reduce development imbalances, and to modernize our architecture for international economic cooperation.

A Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth

2. The growth of the global economy and the success of our coordinated effort to respond to the recent crisis have increased the case for more sustained and systematic international cooperation. In the short-run, we must continue to implement our stimulus programs to support economic activity until recovery clearly has taken hold. We also need to develop a transparent and credible process for withdrawing our extraordinary fiscal, monetary and financial sector support, to be implemented when recovery becomes fully secured. We task our Finance Ministers, working with input from the IMF and FSB, at their November meeting to continue developing cooperative and coordinated exit strategies recognizing that the scale, timing, and sequencing of this process will vary across countries or regions and across the type of policy measures. Credible exit strategies should be designed and communicated clearly to anchor expectations and reinforce confidence.

3. The IMF estimates that world growth will resume this year and rise by nearly 3% by the end of 2010. Subsequently, our objective is to return the world to high, sustainable, and balanced growth, while maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility and sustainability, with reforms to increase our growth potential and capacity to generate jobs and policies designed to avoid both the re-creation of asset bubbles and the re-emergence of unsustainable global financial flows. We commit to put in place the necessary policy measures to achieve these outcomes.

4. We will need to work together as we manage the transition to a more balanced pattern of global growth. The crisis and our initial policy responses have already produced significant shifts in the pattern and level of growth across countries. Many countries have already taken important steps to expand domestic demand, bolstering global activity and reducing imbalances. In some countries, the rise in private saving now underway will, in time, need to be augmented by a rise in public saving. Ensuring a strong recovery will necessitate adjustments across different parts of the global economy, while requiring macroeconomic policies that promote adequate and balanced global demand as well as decisive progress on structural reforms that foster private domestic demand, narrow the global development gap, and strengthen long-run growth potential. The IMF estimates that only with such adjustments and realignments, will global growth reach a strong, sustainable, and balanced pattern. While governments have started moving in the right direction, a shared understanding and deepened dialogue will help build a more stable, lasting, and sustainable pattern of growth. Raising living standards in the emerging markets and developing countries is also a critical element in achieving sustainable growth in the global economy.

5. Today we are launching a Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth. To put in place this framework, we commit to develop a process whereby we set out our objectives, put forward policies to achieve these objectives, and together assess our progress. We will ask the IMF to help us with its analysis of how our respective national or regional policy frameworks fit together. We will ask the World Bank to advise us on progress in promoting development and poverty reduction as part of the rebalancing of global growth. We will work together to ensure that our fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories of growth. We will undertake macro prudential and regulatory policies to help prevent credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces of destabilization. As we commit to implement a new, sustainable growth model, we should encourage work on measurement methods so as to better take into account the social and environmental dimensions of economic development.

6. We call on our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to launch the new Framework by November by initiating a cooperative process of mutual assessment of our policy frameworks and the implications of those frameworks for the pattern and sustainability of global growth. We believe that regular consultations, strengthened cooperation on macroeconomic policies, the exchange of experiences on structural policies, and ongoing assessment will promote the adoption of sound policies and secure a healthy global economy. Our compact is that:

G-20 members will agree on shared policy objectives. These objectives should be updated as conditions evolve.
G-20 members will set out our medium-term policy frameworks and will work together to assess the collective implications of our national policy frameworks for the level and pattern of global growth and to identify potential risks to financial stability.
G-20 Leaders will consider, based on the results of the mutual assessment, and agree any actions to meet our common objectives.
7. This process will only be successful if it is supported by candid, even-handed, and balanced analysis of our policies. We ask the IMF to assist our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in this process of mutual assessment by developing a forward-looking analysis of whether policies pursued by individual G-20 countries are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories for the global economy, and to report regularly to both the G-20 and the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), building on the IMF’s existing bilateral and multilateral surveillance analysis, on global economic developments, patterns of growth and suggested policy adjustments. Our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors will elaborate this process at their November meeting and we will review the results of the first mutual assessment at our next summit.

8. These policies will help us to meet our responsibility to the community of nations to build a more resilient international financial system and to reduce development imbalances.

9. Building on Chancellor Merkel’s proposed Charter, on which we will continue to work, we adopted today Core Values for Sustainable Economic Activity, which will include those of propriety, integrity, and transparency, and which will underpin the Framework.

Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory System

10. Major failures of regulation and supervision, plus reckless and irresponsible risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, created dangerous financial fragilities that contributed significantly to the current crisis. A return to the excessive risk taking prevalent in some countries before the crisis is not an option.

11. Since the onset of the global crisis, we have developed and begun implementing sweeping reforms to tackle the root causes of the crisis and transform the system for global financial regulation. Substantial progress has been made in strengthening prudential oversight, improving risk management, strengthening transparency, promoting market integrity, establishing supervisory colleges, and reinforcing international cooperation. We have enhanced and expanded the scope of regulation and oversight, with tougher regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, securitization markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge funds. We endorse the institutional strengthening of the FSB through its Charter, following its establishment in London, and welcome its reports to Leaders and Ministers. The FSB’s ongoing efforts to monitor progress will be essential to the full and consistent implementation of needed reforms. We call on the FSB to report on progress to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in advance of the next Leaders summit.

12. Yet our work is not done. Far more needs to be done to protect consumers, depositors, and investors against abusive market practices, promote high quality standards, and help ensure the world does not face a crisis of the scope we have seen. We are committed to take action at the national and international level to raise standards together so that our national authorities implement global standards consistently in a way that ensures a level playing field and avoids fragmentation of markets, protectionism, and regulatory arbitrage. Our efforts to deal with impaired assets and to encourage the raising of additional capital must continue, where needed. We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed. We call on banks to retain a greater proportion of current profits to build capital, where needed, to support lending. Securitization sponsors or originators should retain a part of the risk of the underlying assets, thus encouraging them to act prudently. It is important to ensure an adequate balance between macroprudential and microprudential regulation to control risks, and to develop the tools necessary to monitor and assess the buildup of macroprudential risks in the financial system. In addition, we have agreed to improve the regulation, functioning, and transparency of financial and commodity markets to address excessive commodity price volatility.

13. As we encourage the resumption of lending to households and businesses, we must take care not to spur a return of the practices that led to the crisis. The steps we are taking here, when fully implemented, will result in a fundamentally stronger financial system than existed prior to the crisis. If we all act together, financial institutions will have stricter rules for risk-taking, governance that aligns compensation with long-term performance, and greater transparency in their operations. All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards. Our reform is multi-faceted but at its core must be stronger capital standards, complemented by clear incentives to mitigate excessive risk-taking practices. Capital allows banks to withstand those losses that inevitably will come. It, together with more powerful tools for governments to wind down firms that fail, helps us hold firms accountable for the risks that they take. Building on their Declaration on Further Steps to Strengthen the International Financial System, we call on our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to reach agreement on an international framework of reform in the following critical areas:

Building high quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality: We commit to developing by end-2010 internationally agreed rules to improve both the quantity and quality of bank capital and to discourage excessive leverage. These rules will be phased in as financial conditions improve and economic recovery is assured, with the aim of implementation by end-2012. The national implementation of higher level and better quality capital requirements, counter-cyclical capital buffers, higher capital requirements for risky products and off-balance sheet activities, as elements of the Basel II Capital Framework, together with strengthened liquidity risk requirements and forward-looking provisioning, will reduce incentives for banks to take excessive risks and create a financial system better prepared to withstand adverse shocks. We welcome the key measures recently agreed by the oversight body of the Basel Committee to strengthen the supervision and regulation of the banking sector. We support the introduction of a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and calibration. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonized internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting. All major G-20 financial centers commit to have adopted the Basel II Capital Framework by 2011.
Reforming compensation practices to support financial stability: Excessive compensation in the financial sector has both reflected and encouraged excessive risk taking. Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential part of our effort to increase financial stability. We fully endorse the implementation standards of the FSB aimed at aligning compensation with long-term value creation, not excessive risk-taking, including by (i) avoiding multi-year guaranteed bonuses; (ii) requiring a significant portion of variable compensation to be deferred, tied to performance and subject to appropriate clawback and to be vested in the form of stock or stock-like instruments, as long as these create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizon of risk; (iii) ensuring that compensation for senior executives and other employees having a material impact on the firm’s risk exposure align with performance and risk; (iv) making firms’ compensation policies and structures transparent through disclosure requirements; (v) limiting variable compensation as a percentage of total net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base; and (vi) ensuring that compensation committees overseeing compensation policies are able to act independently. Supervisors should have the responsibility to review firms’ compensation policies and structures with institutional and systemic risk in mind and, if necessary to offset additional risks, apply corrective measures, such as higher capital requirements, to those firms that fail to implement sound compensation policies and practices. Supervisors should have the ability to modify compensation structures in the case of firms that fail or require extraordinary public intervention. We call on firms to implement these sound compensation practices immediately. We task the FSB to monitor the implementation of FSB standards and propose additional measures as required by March 2010.
Improving over-the-counter derivatives markets: All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.
Addressing cross-border resolutions and systemically important financial institutions by end-2010: Systemically important financial firms should develop internationally-consistent firm-specific contingency and resolution plans. Our authorities should establish crisis management groups for the major cross-border firms and a legal framework for crisis intervention as well as improve information sharing in times of stress. We should develop resolution tools and frameworks for the effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the disruption of financial institution failures and reduce moral hazard in the future. Our prudential standards for systemically important institutions should be commensurate with the costs of their failure. The FSB should propose by the end of October 2010 possible measures including more intensive supervision and specific additional capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements.
14. We call on our international accounting bodies to redouble their efforts to achieve a single set of high quality, global accounting standards within the context of their independent standard setting process, and complete their convergence project by June 2011. The International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) institutional framework should further enhance the involvement of various stakeholders.

15. Our commitment to fight non-cooperative jurisdictions (NCJs) has produced impressive results. We are committed to maintain the momentum in dealing with tax havens, money laundering, proceeds of corruption, terrorist financing, and prudential standards. We welcome the expansion of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, including the participation of developing countries, and welcome the agreement to deliver an effective program of peer review. The main focus of the Forum’s work will be to improve tax transparency and exchange of information so that countries can fully enforce their tax laws to protect their tax base. We stand ready to use countermeasures against tax havens from March 2010. We welcome the progress made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and call upon the FATF to issue a public list of high risk jurisdictions by February 2010. We call on the FSB to report progress to address NCJs with regards to international cooperation and information exchange in November 2009 and to initiate a peer review process by February 2010.

16. We task the IMF to prepare a report for our next meeting with regard to the range of options countries have adopted or are considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the banking system.

Modernizing our Global Institutions to Reflect Today’s Global Economy

17. Modernizing the international financial institutions and global development architecture is essential to our efforts to promote global financial stability, foster sustainable development, and lift the lives of the poorest. We warmly welcome Prime Minister Brown’s report on his review of the responsiveness and adaptability of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and ask our Finance Ministers to consider its conclusions.

Reforming the Mandate, Mission and Governance of the IMF

18. Our commitment to increase the funds available to the IMF allowed it to stem the spread of the crisis to emerging markets and developing countries. This commitment and the innovative steps the IMF has taken to create the facilities needed for its resources to be used efficiently and flexibly have reduced global risks. Capital again is flowing to emerging economies.

19. We have delivered on our promise to treble the resources available to the IMF. We are contributing over $500 billion to a renewed and expanded IMF New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). The IMF has made Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations of $283 billion in total, more than $100 billion of which will supplement emerging market and developing countries’ existing reserve assets. Resources from the agreed sale of IMF gold, consistent with the IMF’s new income model, and funds from internal and other sources will more than double the Fund’s medium-term concessional lending capacity.

20. Our collective response to the crisis has highlighted both the benefits of international cooperation and the need for a more legitimate and effective IMF. The Fund must play a critical role in promoting global financial stability and rebalancing growth. We welcome the reform of IMF’s lending facilities, including the creation of the innovative Flexible Credit Line. The IMF should continue to strengthen its capacity to help its members cope with financial volatility, reducing the economic disruption from sudden swings in capital flows and the perceived need for excessive reserve accumulation. As recovery takes hold, we will work together to strengthen the Fund’s ability to provide even-handed, candid and independent surveillance of the risks facing the global economy and the international financial system. We ask the IMF to support our effort under the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth through its surveillance of our countries’ policy frameworks and their collective implications for financial stability and the level and pattern of global growth.

21. Modernizing the IMF’s governance is a core element of our effort to improve the IMF’s credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness. We recognize that the IMF should remain a quota-based organization and that the distribution of quotas should reflect the relative weights of its members in the world economy, which have changed substantially in view of the strong growth in dynamic emerging market and developing countries. To this end, we are committed to a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing countries of at least five percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current IMF quota formula as the basis to work from. We are also committed to protecting the voting share of the poorest in the IMF. On this basis and as part of the IMF’s quota review, to be completed by January 2011, we urge an acceleration of work toward bringing the review to a successful conclusion. As part of that review, we agree that a number of other critical issues will need to be addressed, including: the size of any increase in IMF quotas, which will have a bearing on the ability to facilitate change in quota shares; the size and composition of the Executive Board; ways of enhancing the Board’s effectiveness; and the Fund Governors’ involvement in the strategic oversight of the IMF. Staff diversity should be enhanced. As part of a comprehensive reform package, we agree that the heads and senior leadership of all international institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based process. We must urgently implement the package of IMF quota and voice reforms agreed in April 2008.

Reforming the Mission, Mandate and Governance of Our Development banks

22. The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) responded to our April call to accelerate and expand lending to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the world’s poorest with streamlined facilities, new tools and facilities, and a rapid increase in their lending. They are on track to deliver the promised $100 billion in additional lending. We welcome and encourage the MDBs to continue making full use of their balance sheets. We also welcome additional measures such as the temporary use of callable capital contributions from a select group of donors as was done at the InterAmerican Development Bank (IaDB). Our Finance Ministers should consider how mechanisms such as temporary callable and contingent capital could be used in the future to increase MDB lending at times of crisis. We reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the Multilateral Development Banks and their concessional lending facilities, especially the International Development Agency (IDA) and the African Development Fund, are appropriately funded.

23. Even as we work to mitigate the impact of the crisis, we must strengthen and reform the global development architecture for responding to the world’s long-term challenges.

24. We agree that development and reducing global poverty are central to the development banks’ core mission. The World Bank and other multilateral development banks are also critical to our ability to act together to address challenges, such as climate change and food security, which are global in nature and require globally coordinated action. The World Bank, working with the regional development banks and other international organizations, should strengthen:

its focus on food security through enhancements in agricultural productivity and access to technology, and improving access to food, in close cooperation with relevant specialized agencies;
its focus on human development and security in the poorest and most challenging environments;
support for private-sector led growth and infrastructure to enhance opportunities for the poorest, social and economic inclusion, and economic growth; and
contributions to financing the transition to a green economy through investment in sustainable clean energy generation and use, energy efficiency and climate resilience; this includes responding to countries needs to integrate climate change concerns into their core development strategies, improved domestic policies, and to access new sources of climate finance.
25. To enhance their effectiveness, the World Bank and the regional development banks should strengthen their coordination, when appropriate, with other bilateral and multilateral institutions. They should also strengthen recipient country ownership of strategies and programs and allow adequate policy space.

26. We will help ensure the World Bank and the regional development banks have sufficient resources to fulfill these four challenges and their development mandate, including through a review of their general capital increase needs to be completed by the first half of 2010. Additional resources must be joined to key institutional reforms to ensure effectiveness: greater coordination and a clearer division of labor; an increased commitment to transparency, accountability, and good corporate governance; an increased capacity to innovate and achieve demonstrable results; and greater attention to the needs of the poorest populations.

27. We commit to pursue governance and operational effectiveness reform in conjunction with voting reform to ensure that the World Bank is relevant, effective, and legitimate. We stress the importance of moving towards equitable voting power in the World Bank over time through the adoption of a dynamic formula which primarily reflects countries’ evolving economic weight and the World Bank’s development mission, and that generates in the next shareholding review a significant increase of at least 3% of voting power for developing and transition countries, in addition to the 1.46% increase under the first phase of this important adjustment, to the benefit of under-represented countries. While recognizing that over-represented countries will make a contribution, it will be important to protect the voting power of the smallest poor countries. We recommit to reaching agreement by the 2010 Spring Meetings.

Energy Security and Climate Change

28. Access to diverse, reliable, affordable and clean energy is critical for sustainable growth. Inefficient markets and excessive volatility negatively affect both producers and consumers. Noting the St. Petersburg Principles on Global Energy Security, which recognize the shared interest of energy producing, consuming and transiting countries in promoting global energy security, we individually and collectively commit to:

Increase energy market transparency and market stability by publishing complete, accurate, and timely data on oil production, consumption, refining and stock levels, as appropriate, on a regular basis, ideally monthly, beginning by January 2010. We note the Joint Oil Data Initiative as managed by the International Energy Forum (IEF) and welcome their efforts to examine the expansion of their data collection to natural gas. We will improve our domestic capabilities to collect energy data and improve energy demand and supply forecasting and ask the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ramp up their efforts to assist interested countries in developing those capabilities. We will strengthen the producer-consumer dialogue to improve our understanding of market fundamentals, including supply and demand trends, and price volatility, and note the work of the IEF experts group.
Improve regulatory oversight of energy markets by implementing the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recommendations on commodity futures markets and calling on relevant regulators to collect data on large concentrations of trader positions on oil in our national commodities futures markets. We ask our relevant regulators to report back at our next meeting on progress towards implementation. We will direct relevant regulators to also collect related data on over-the-counter oil markets and to take steps to combat market manipulation leading to excessive price volatility. We call for further refinement and improvement of commodity market information, including through the publication of more detailed and disaggregated data, coordinated as far as possible internationally. We ask IOSCO to help national governments design and implement these policies, conduct further analysis including with regard with to excessive volatility, make specific recommendations, and to report regularly on our progress.
29. Enhancing our energy efficiency can play an important, positive role in promoting energy security and fighting climate change. Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies encourage wasteful consumption, distort markets, impede investment in clean energy sources and undermine efforts to deal with climate change. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the IEA have found that eliminating fossil fuel subsidies by 2020 would reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 by ten percent. Many countries are reducing fossil fuel subsidies while preventing adverse impact on the poorest. Building on these efforts and recognizing the challenges of populations suffering from energy poverty, we commit to:

Rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption. As we do that, we recognize the importance of providing those in need with essential energy services, including through the use of targeted cash transfers and other appropriate mechanisms. This reform will not apply to our support for clean energy, renewables, and technologies that dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We will have our Energy and Finance Ministers, based on their national circumstances, develop implementation strategies and timeframes, and report back to Leaders at the next Summit. We ask the international financial institutions to offer support to countries in this process. We call on all nations to adopt policies that will phase out such subsidies worldwide.
30. We request relevant institutions, such as the IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank, provide an analysis of the scope of energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this initiative and report back at the next summit.

31. Increasing clean and renewable energy supplies, improving energy efficiency, and promoting conservation are critical steps to protect our environment, promote sustainable growth and address the threat of climate change. Accelerated adoption of economically sound clean and renewable energy technology and energy efficiency measures diversifies our energy supplies and strengthens our energy security. We commit to:

Stimulate investment in clean energy, renewables, and energy efficiency and provide financial and technical support for such projects in developing countries.
Take steps to facilitate the diffusion or transfer of clean energy technology including by conducting joint research and building capacity. The reduction or elimination of barriers to trade and investment in this area are being discussed and should be pursued on a voluntary basis and in appropriate fora.
32. As leaders of the world’s major economies, we are working for a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery. We underscore anew our resolve to take strong action to address the threat of dangerous climate change. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including common but differentiated responsibilities. We note the principles endorsed by Leaders at the Major Economies Forum in L’Aquila, Italy. We will intensify our efforts, in cooperation with other parties, to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the UNFCCC negotiation. An agreement must include mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing.

33. We welcome the work of the Finance Ministers and direct them to report back at their next meeting with a range of possible options for climate change financing to be provided as a resource to be considered in the UNFCCC negotiations at Copenhagen.

Strengthening Support for the Most Vulnerable

34. Many emerging and developing economies have made great strides in raising living standards as their economies converge toward the productivity levels and living standards of advanced economies. This process was interrupted by the crisis and is still far from complete. The poorest countries have little economic cushion to protect vulnerable populations from calamity, particularly as the financial crisis followed close on the heels of a global spike in food prices. We note with concern the adverse impact of the global crisis on low income countries’ (LICs) capacity to protect critical core spending in areas such as health, education, safety nets, and infrastructure. The UN’s new Global Impact Vulnerability Alert System will help our efforts to monitor the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable. We share a collective responsibility to mitigate the social impact of the crisis and to assure that all parts of the globe participate in the recovery.

35. The MDBs play a key role in the fight against poverty. We recognize the need for accelerated and additional concessional financial support to LICs to cushion the impact of the crisis on the poorest, welcome the increase in MDB lending during the crisis and support the MDBs having the resources needed to avoid a disruption of concessional financing to the most vulnerable countries. The IMF also has increased its concessional lending to LICs during the crisis. Resources from the sale of IMF gold, consistent with the new income model, and funds from internal and other sources will double the Fund’s medium-term concessional lending capacity.

36. Several countries are considering creating, on a voluntary basis, mechanisms that could allow, consistent with their national circumstances, the mobilization of existing SDR resources to support the IMF’s lending to the poorest countries. Even as we work to mitigate the impact of the crisis, we must strengthen and reform the global development architecture for responding to the world’s long-term challenges. We ask our relevant ministers to explore the benefits of a new crisis support facility in IDA to protect LICs from future crises and the enhanced use of financial instruments in protecting the investment plans of middle income countries from interruption in times of crisis, including greater use of guarantees.

37. We reaffirm our historic commitment to meet the Millennium Development Goals and our respective Official Development Assistance (ODA) pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and those made at Gleneagles, especially to sub-Saharan Africa, to 2010 and beyond.

38. Even before the crisis, too many still suffered from hunger and poverty and even more people lack access to energy and finance. Recognizing that the crisis has exacerbated this situation, we pledge cooperation to improve access to food, fuel, and finance for the poor.

39. Sustained funding and targeted investments are urgently needed to improve long-term food security. We welcome and support the food security initiative announced in L’Aquila and efforts to further implement the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security and to address excessive price volatility. We call on the World Bank to work with interested donors and organizations to develop a multilateral trust fund to scale-up agricultural assistance to low-income countries. This will help support innovative bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve global nutrition and build sustainable agricultural systems, including programs like those developed through the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). It should be designed to ensure country ownership and rapid disbursement of funds, fully respecting the aid effectiveness principles agreed in Accra, and facilitate the participation of private foundations, businesses, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this historic effort. These efforts should complement the UN Comprehensive Framework for Agriculture. We ask the World Bank, the African Development Bank, UN, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Food Programme (WFP) and other stakeholders to coordinate their efforts, including through country-led mechanisms, in order to complement and reinforce other existing multilateral and bilateral efforts to tackle food insecurity.

40. To increase access to energy, we will promote the deployment of clean, affordable energy resources to the developing world. We commit, on a voluntary basis, to funding programs that achieve this objective, such as the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program and the Energy for the Poor Initiative, and to increasing and more closely harmonizing our bilateral efforts.

41. We commit to improving access to financial services for the poor. We have agreed to support the safe and sound spread of new modes of financial service delivery capable of reaching the poor and, building on the example of micro finance, will scale up the successful models of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing. Working with the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and other international organizations, we will launch a G-20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group. This group will identify lessons learned on innovative approaches to providing financial services to these groups, promote successful regulatory and policy approaches and elaborate standards on financial access, financial literacy, and consumer protection. We commit to launch a G-20 SME Finance Challenge, a call to the private sector to put forward its best proposals for how public finance can maximize the deployment of private finance on a sustainable and scalable basis.

42. As we increase the flow of capital to developing countries, we also need to prevent its illicit outflow. We will work with the World Bank’s Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) program to secure the return of stolen assets to developing countries, and support other efforts to stem illicit outflows. We ask the FATF to help detect and deter the proceeds of corruption by prioritizing work to strengthen standards on customer due diligence, beneficial ownership and transparency. We note the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action and will work to increase the transparency of international aid flows by 2010. We call for the adoption and enforcement of laws against transnational bribery, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the ratification by the G-20 of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the adoption during the third Conference of the Parties in Doha of an effective, transparent, and inclusive mechanism for the review of its implementation. We support voluntary participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which calls for regular public disclosure of payments by extractive industries to governments and reconciliation against recorded receipt of those funds by governments.

Putting Quality Jobs at the Heart of the Recovery

43. The prompt, vigorous and sustained response of our countries has saved or created millions of jobs. Based on International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates, our efforts will have created or saved at least 7 – 11 million jobs by the end of this year. Without sustained action, unemployment is likely to continue rising in many of our countries even after economies stabilize, with a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable segments of our population. As growth returns, every country must act to ensure that employment recovers quickly. We commit to implementing recovery plans that support decent work, help preserve employment, and prioritize job growth. In addition, we will continue to provide income, social protection, and training support for the unemployed and those most at risk of unemployment. We agree that the current challenges do not provide an excuse to disregard or weaken internationally recognized labor standards. To assure that global growth is broadly beneficial, we should implement policies consistent with ILO fundamental principles and rights at work.

44. Our new Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth requires structural reforms to create more inclusive labor markets, active labor market policies, and quality education and training programs. Each of our countries will need, through its own national policies, to strengthen the ability of our workers to adapt to changing market demands and to benefit from innovation and investments in new technologies, clean energy, environment, health, and infrastructure. It is no longer sufficient to train workers to meet their specific current needs; we should ensure access to training programs that support lifelong skills development and focus on future market needs. Developed countries should support developing countries to build and strengthen their capacities in this area. These steps will help to assure that the gains from new inventions and lifting existing impediments to growth are broadly shared.

45. We pledge to support robust training efforts in our growth strategies and investments. We recognize successful employment and training programs are often designed together with employers and workers, and we call on the ILO, in partnership with other organizations, to convene its constituents and NGOs to develop a training strategy for our consideration.

46. We agree on the importance of building an employment-oriented framework for future economic growth. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of the London Jobs Conference and Rome Social Summit. We also welcome the recently-adopted ILO Resolution on Recovering from the Crisis: A Global Jobs Pact, and we commit our nations to adopt key elements of its general framework to advance the social dimension of globalization. The international institutions should consider ILO standards and the goals of the Jobs Pact in their crisis and post-crisis analysis and policy-making activities.

47. To ensure our continued focus on employment policies, the Chair of the Pittsburgh Summit has asked his Secretary of Labor to invite our Employment and Labor Ministers to meet as a group in early 2010 consulting with labor and business and building on the upcoming OECD Labour and Employment Ministerial meeting on the jobs crisis. We direct our Ministers to assess the evolving employment situation, review reports from the ILO and other organizations on the impact of policies we have adopted, report on whether further measures are desirable, and consider medium-term employment and skills development policies, social protection programs, and best practices to ensure workers are prepared to take advantage of advances in science and technology.

An Open Global Economy

48. Continuing the revival in world trade and investment is essential to restoring global growth. It is imperative we stand together to fight against protectionism. We welcome the swift implementation of the $250 billion trade finance initiative. We will keep markets open and free and reaffirm the commitments made in Washington and London: to refrain from raising barriers or imposing new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports and commit to rectify such measures as they arise. We will minimize any negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic policy actions, including fiscal policy and action to support the financial sector. We will not retreat into financial protectionism, particularly measures that constrain worldwide capital flows, especially to developing countries. We will notify promptly the WTO of any relevant trade measures. We welcome the latest joint report from the WTO, OECD, IMF, and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and ask them to continue to monitor the situation within their respective mandates, reporting publicly on these commitments on a quarterly basis.

49. We remain committed to further trade liberalization. We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Development Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalities. We understand the need for countries to directly engage with each other, within the WTO bearing in mind the centrality of the multilateral process, in order to evaluate and close the remaining gaps. We note that in order to conclude the negotiations in 2010, closing those gaps should proceed as quickly as possible. We ask our ministers to take stock of the situation no later than early 2010, taking into account the results of the work program agreed to in Geneva following the Delhi Ministerial, and seek progress on Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access, as well as Services, Rules, Trade Facilitation and all other remaining issues. We will remain engaged and review the progress of the negotiations at our next meeting.

The Path from Pittsburgh

50. Today, we designated the G-20 as the premier forum for our international economic cooperation. We have asked our representatives to report back at the next meeting with recommendations on how to maximize the effectiveness of our cooperation. We agreed to have a G-20 Summit in Canada in June 2010, and in Korea in November 2010. We expect to meet annually thereafter, and will meet in France in 2011.

ANNEX: Core Values for Sustainable Economic Activity

1. The economic crisis demonstrates the importance of ushering in a new era of sustainable global economic activity grounded in responsibility. The current crisis has once again confirmed the fundamental recognition that our growth and prosperity are interconnected, and that no region of the globe can wall itself off in a globalized world economy.

2. We, the Leaders of the countries gathered for the Pittsburgh Summit, recognize that concerted action is needed to help our economies get back to stable ground and prosper tomorrow. We commit to taking responsible actions to ensure that every stakeholder – consumers, workers, investors, entrepreneurs – can participate in a balanced, equitable, and inclusive global economy.

3. We share the overarching goal to promote a broader prosperity for our people through balanced growth within and across nations; through coherent economic, social, and environmental strategies; and through robust financial systems and effective international collaboration.

4. We recognize that there are different approaches to economic development and prosperity, and that strategies to achieve these goals may vary according to countries’ circumstances.

5. We also agree that certain key principles are fundamental, and in this spirit we commit to respect the following core values:

We have a responsibility to ensure sound macroeconomic policies that serve long-term economic objectives and help avoid unsustainable global imbalances.
We have a responsibility to reject protectionism in all its forms, support open markets, foster fair and transparent competition, and promote entrepreneurship and innovation across countries.
We have a responsibility to ensure, through appropriate rules and incentives, that financial and other markets function based on propriety, integrity and transparency and to encourage businesses to support the efficient allocation of resources for sustainable economic performance.
We have a responsibility to provide for financial markets that serve the needs of households, businesses and productive investment by strengthening oversight, transparency, and accountability.
We have a responsibility to secure our future through sustainable consumption, production and use of resources that conserve our environment and address the challenge of climate change.
We have a responsibility to invest in people by providing education, job training, decent work conditions, health care and social safety net support, and to fight poverty, discrimination, and all forms of social exclusion.
We have a responsibility to recognize that all economies, rich and poor, are partners in building a sustainable and balanced global economy in which the benefits of economic growth are broadly and equitably shared. We also have a responsibility to achieve the internationally agreed development goals.
We have a responsibility to ensure an international economic and financial architecture that reflects changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalization.

G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth

1. Our countries have a shared responsibility to adopt policies to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth, to promote a resilient international financial system, and to reap the benefits of an open global economy. To this end, we recognize that our strategies will vary across countries. In our Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, we will:

implement responsible fiscal policies, attentive to short-term flexibility considerations and longer-run sustainability requirements.
strengthen financial supervision to prevent the re-emergence in the financial system of excess credit growth and excess leverage and undertake macro prudential and regulatory policies to help prevent credit and asset price cycles from becoming forces of destabilization.
promote more balanced current accounts and support open trade and investment to advance global prosperity and growth sustainability, while actively rejecting protectionist measures.
undertake monetary policies consistent with price stability in the context of market oriented exchange rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals.
undertake structural reforms to increase our potential growth rates and, where needed, improve social safety nets.
promote balanced and sustainable economic development in order to narrow development imbalances and reduce poverty.

2. We recognize that the process to ensure more balanced global growth must be undertaken in an orderly manner. All G-20 members agree to address the respective weaknesses of their economies.

G-20 members with sustained, significant external deficits pledge to undertake policies to support private savings and undertake fiscal consolidation while maintaining open markets and strengthening export sectors.
G-20 members with sustained, significant external surpluses pledge to strengthen domestic sources of growth. According to national circumstances this could include increasing investment, reducing financial markets distortions, boosting productivity in service sectors, improving social safety nets, and lifting constraints on demand growth.
3. Each G-20 member bears primary responsibility for the sound management of its economy. The G-20 members also have a responsibility to the community of nations to assure the overall health of the global economy. Regular consultations, strengthened cooperation on macroeconomic policies, the exchange of experiences on structural policies, and ongoing assessment can strengthen our cooperation and promote the adoption of sound policies. As part of our process of mutual assessment:

G-20 members will agree on shared policy objectives. These objectives should be updated as conditions evolve.
G-20 members will set out their medium-term policy frameworks and will work together to assess the collective implications of our national policy frameworks for the level and pattern of global growth, and to identify potential risks to financial stability.
G-20 leaders will consider, based on the results of the mutual assessment, and agree any actions to meet our common objectives.
4. We call on our Finance Ministers to develop our process of mutual assessment to evaluate the collective implications of national policies for the world economy. To accomplish this, our Finance Ministers should, with the assistance of the IMF:

Develop a forward looking assessment of G-20 economic developments to help analyze whether patterns of demand and supply, credit, debt and reserves growth are supportive of strong, sustainable and balanced growth.
Assess the implications and consistency of fiscal and monetary policies, credit growth and asset markets, foreign exchange developments, commodity and energy prices, and current account imbalances.
Report regularly to both the G-20 and the IMFC on global economic developments, key risks, and concerns with respect to patterns of growth and suggested G-20 policy adjustments, individually and collectively.

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Medium-term economic plan foresees long-term unemployment trouble

Todayszaman, 20 September 2009

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-187624-medium-term-economic-plan-foresees-long-term-unemployment-trouble.html

It will be years before Turkey’s unemployment rates drop to anywhere in the region of pre-crisis levels — a grim prospect for a nation with a booming population.
Small month-on-month improvements in the unemployment rate still fall drastically short of returning to pre-crisis levels, and the government’s grim forecasts for employment recovery reflect the reality that Turkey has its work cut out in terms of creating jobs.

Experts say minute statistical improvements are not enough to mask what is becoming increasingly clear: Unemployment recovery is not around the corner, and Turkey stands to struggle with high jobless rates for several years to come. Economy Minister Ali Babacan unveiled a medium-term economic plan last week that focuses on putting budget balances back on track between 2010 and 2012. While the minister said in his announcement that the government expected modest recovery in unemployment, the economic plan does not include extensive measures to minimize the soaring numbers of jobless in Turkey.

The government is forecasting unemployment as an average 14.6 percent in 2010 — very close to this year’s expectation of 14.8 percent. Analysts have pegged the government’s medium-term plan as realistic. “From what I’ve seen of the medium-term plan, there are no microeconomic measures included to address unemployment,” Dr. Murat Yülek, a former World Bank economist and now chairman of PGlobal Global Advisory Services, told Sunday’s Zaman. Yülek was careful to note that Turkey was still dealing with a crisis and that beyond a slow pace of improvement in unemployment rates, it still remained to be seen whether many firms would be able to stay on their feet amidst the financial turmoil. Further layoffs and company closures are still a very real possibility, he noted. At first glance, unemployment trends seem to be improving. On Tuesday, the latest Household Labor Survey released by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) said Turkey’s unemployment rate dropped to 13 percent in June, a drop from the May rate of 13.6 percent — which was in itself a significant drop from April’s figure of 14.9 percent. But the numbers remain well above the 10.8 percent levels enjoyed before the global financial crisis broke. Unemployment rates rose to highs of 16.1 percent and 13.6 percent, respectively, in the first two quarters of 2009 as Turkey was buffeted by the effects of the crisis. The number of unemployed in Turkey grew by 972,000 over the same month of 2008, representing a 3.6 percent increase. Some 3.27 million people are currently without jobs in Turkey.

Yülek said the acting assumption of the government’s medium-term plan in terms of employment could be the generation of private sector activity and investment through macroeconomic-level balancing of the country’s budget. On Friday, Turkish Confederation of Employers’ Unions (TİSK) Chairman Tuğrul Kutadgobilik criticized the medium-term economic program, saying it was not clear how the government was going to achieve even a slow improvement in unemployment rates. Noting that the program foresaw the creation of 1.25 million jobs, he said: “During the crisis period the same number of people lost their jobs; in the three years in question [the program says that] 1.8 million more people will enter the workforce. When it is noted that unemployment isn’t a problem that will resolve itself, the need for special measures becomes obvious.”

Capacity to create new employment restricted

There is also, of course, the issue of the reasons for change in employment statistics. On Thursday, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) released a report titled “The Effects of Business Size and Regional Differences over Employment Losses during the Crisis.” However, the TEPAV report notes that the relative improvement in the unemployment rate in the second quarter of the year stemmed from a decrease in the number of people looking for a job and the growing number of people who have lost hope over employment prospects, emphasizing that the number of people employed in the first two quarters of 2009 dropped by 85,000 in the first quarter and by 387,000 in the second quarter compared to the same periods of 2008.

TurkStat does not count those not actively seeking employment in its unemployment figures, thereby approximately halving the number of those counted in the statistics. Yülek noted in his comments that in terms of employment participation Turkey has a different demographic than many developed European countries, with higher numbers of people without the intention of entering the workforce.

Even more troubling, TurkStat’s data demonstrate that along with a drop in the number of employed, Turkey has seen an increase in the size of the nation’s working-age, non-institutional population (which excludes students, prisoners and those serving in the military) — up by 875,000 people in June 2009 compared to the previous year. Turkey has one of the world’s fastest-growing populations, which means that this trend is also likely to continue. And with employment opportunities not rising in parallel to population growth, the road ahead could be rocky.

“I don’t see the employment situation improving in the near future,” Yülek said, in an assessment that reflects what many have been saying in reaction to the unemployment rate forecasts. “The first reason for this is that we are amidst a crisis. Employers are trying to maintain production levels with minimum staffing; this is an increase in efficiency but does not generate employment.” The economist also noted the current volatility in foreign exchange rates that place a heavy burden on Turkish exporters. “Turkish companies have to deal with competition both at home and abroad. When exporting to, say, Spain, Turkish products compete with what’s on the market there. Here in Turkey, Turkish items are sold alongside items made in other places, like Belgium, that are priced similarly or even more cheaply,” he explained.

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